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1 Introduction 
It is well known that the distribution of income afi'ords a useful, but incomplete, 
means of evaluating social inequities. Indeed, Amartya Sen is very clear on this 
point: 1 
"An important and frequently encountered problem arises from con-
centrating on inequality of incomes as the primary focus of attention in 
the analysis of inequality. The extent of real inequality of opportunities 
that people face cannot be readily deduced from the magnitude of inequal-
ity of incomes, since what we can or cannot do, can or cannot achieve, do 
not depend just on our incomes but also on the variety of physical and 
social characteristics that afi'ect our lives and make us what we are." 
Consequently, various authors have suggested that we expand or shift our focus to 
other indicators of well-being. For example, Rawls (1971) has argued that we should 
concentrate on the distribution of primary goods such as rights, liberties and social 
determinants of self-respect. Dworkin (1981) and Roemer (1986) have suggested that 
\Ve focus on the distribution of resources. And Sen (1980, 1992) has proposed the 
distribution of Ireedoms and capabilities for the same purpose. 
In this paper, we abstract from the issue of the appropriate equalisandum. Rather, 
we refer to the collective determinants of well-being as opportunities, and we consider 
the follo\Ving question: Assuming individuals have preferences over their alternative 
sets of opportunities, how can we compare different distributions of opportunity sets? 
In particular, which distribution affords the greater degree of equality? 
In the unidimensional case of income inequality, this question has been studied ex-
tensively. From the seminal contributions ofKolm (1969), Atkinson (1970), Dasgupta 
et al (1973), and Rotschild and Stiglitz (1973), a minimal consensus has emerged. A 
ranking of income distributions should be consistent with the Lorenz partial ordering, 
for this ordering is supported by all inequality averse welfare functionals, and it is 
the only ordering which is consistent with our intuition that rank-preserving transfers 
from rich to poor should decrease inequality. 
We wish to establish analogous results for the multidimensional problem of ranking 
distributions of opportunity sets. First, to distill the argument to its essential forrn, 
\Ve concentrate on the two-agent case.2 We then formulate an analog of equalizing 
(Dalton) transfers relative to a given ordering 01 individual opportunity sets. This 
ISen (1992), p. 28. (Emphasis in the original.) 
2Two remarks on this concentration are in order. First. an 'agent' may aiso be thought of as 
a 'class' rather than an individual. For example, if A and B are subsets of a given universal set 
of opportunities, (A, B) may represent an opportunity distribution of a certain society where A is 
the opportunity set of women in the population and B is that of men. Second, we stress that the 
rncasurement of opportunity incquality is a far more difficult matter than that of income inequality, 
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lets us define the corresponding concepts of Lorenz partial ordering and inequality 
averse social welíare functionals (both of which are again defined relative to a given 
opportunity set ordering). 
To demonstrate the usefulness of this approach, we consider the example in which 
agents rank opportunity sets on the basis of their cardinalities (or in other words, 
where they attach the same welfare weight to each and every opportunity).3 In 
this particular case, we establish an analogue of the fundamental theorem of income 
inequality: one distribution of opportunity sets Lorenz dominates another if and 
only if the former can be obtained from the latter by a finite sequence of equalizing 
transfers, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by al! inequality 
averse social welfare functionals. 
As in the standard theory, our generalization of the Lorenz ordering is well-defined 
only when the set of aggregate opportunities is fixed. In the case of income inequality, 
this is easily accornmodated by normalizing total income and focusing on relative 
inequality. Here, however, no such normalization is available, and we must study 
appropriate extensions of the Lorenz ordering directly. We do this by charaeterizing 
the smal1est monotonic and transitive extension of the induced Lorenz inequality 
ordering. 
The paper is organized as fol1ows. In the next section, we review the relevant 
results of the theory of income inequaIity measurement and state a fundamental 
theorem. In Section 3, we formula te the principIe of rank preserving equalizations 
conditional on agent's ranking of opportunity sets. In Sections 4 and 5, we consider 
the case where agents rank the opportunity sets on the basis of their cardinalities, and 
within this framework, develop the analysis of Lorenz partial ordering and inequality 
averse social welfare functionals. The results obtained in these sections yield an 
analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement which is discussed in 
Section 6. Section 7 is then devoted to a study of monotonic and transitive extensions 
of the induced Lorenz ordering. The paper concludes with identifying an agenda for 
future research. 
and that the problem is by no means trivial when we restrict our attention to two-agent situations. 
lndeed, since a theory oC opportunity inequality is not readily available, it only makes sense to study 
the problem in its simplest possible Corm and then study possible extensions. 
3We do not, oC course, suggest that the cardinality ordering is the best way oC ranking opportunity 
sets. The advantage oC this ordering lies in its analytical simplicity al10wing us to concentrate on the 
inherent difficulties oC opportunity inequality measurement in the simplest possible framework. For 
an extensive treatment oC the cardinality ordering, we refer the reader to Pattanaik and Xu (1990) 
and Puppe (1995a) where it is axiomatical1y studied as an ordering which focuses only on the degree 
oC Creedom oC choice an opportunity set provides to an agent. See, Sen (1991) and Klemisch-Ahlert 
(1993) Cor critical discussions. 
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2 Preliminaries 
2.1 The Fundamental Theorem of Inequality Economics 
This subsection contains a brief review of sorne of the well-known concepts of the 
theory of inequality measurement. For exhaustive reviews of the topie, we refer the 
reader to Foster (1985) and Larnbert (1993). 
Let IR1f := {t E IR~ : tI ::; t2 ::; ... ::; tH}, H 2: 2. The elernents of IR1f are 
interpreted as the illfare ordered distributions of income. 
The ordinary strict Lorenz partial ordering >L e IR~ x IR~ is defined as 
x >L y if and only if 
s s H H 
¿X(i) 2: LY(i) for all s E {1,2, ... ,H -1} and LXi = LYi, 
i=l i=l i=l i=l 
and 
s s 
¿X(i) > ¿Y(i) for sorne s E {1,2, ... ,H}, 
i=l i=l 
where, for any t E IR~, t() = (t(l» t(2), ... , t(H») is a permutation of t such that 
t( ) E IR1i. The ordinary Lorenz ordering is then defined as 
A function W : IR~ - IR is said to be S-concave (Schur-concave) if, for any 
x,Y E IR~, 
X 2:L y irnplies W(x) 2: W(y). 
The usual ínterpretation of 111(.) is to treat it as an individualistic social welfare 
function where all the individuals have the sarne preferences for íncorne. For instance, 
W : x 1-------+ L~l U(Xi), where u(.) is any increasing function on IR+ is the classical 
utilitarian social welfare function. If we assurne that u(.) is eoncave on IR+, then this 
welfare function is necessarily S-concave (d. Atkinson (1970) and Dasgupta et al. 
(1973)). 
The equalizing (Dalton) transfer operator T : lR1i - 2R~ is defined as 
x E T(y) if and only if there exists an € 2: Oand i,j E {1, .." H}, i < j, sueh that 
x¡ = y¡ + €, Xj = Yj - € and Xk = Yk for all k E {l,2, ... ,H}\{i,j}.4 
If x E T(y), we understand that either X is equal to y or it can be obtained frorn y by 
transfering a certain arnount of rnoney frorn a richer individual to a poorer individual 
such that the relative positions of these individuals remain unchanged. One of the 
4 Let A be any seto The power set of A is denoted by 2A , that is, 2A := {B : B ~ A}. 
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rnost basic prernises of the theory of incorne inequality rneasurernent is to regard x 
as less unequal than y whenever x E T(y). A natural extension of this premise is to 
regard x as less unequal than y if, for sorne n E N, there exist Xl, X2, ... , xn E IRt 
such that 
Xl E T(y), X2 E T(XI), ... , xn E T(Xn-l) and X E T(xn). 
We write, for any n = 2,3, "', 
and define the ordinary Dalton ordering ~D e IR~ x IR~ as 
X ~D Y if and only if x() E Tn(y( ») for sorne n ~ 1. 
In the terrninology of Fields and Fei (1978), if x ~D y, we understand that either x is 
equal to y or it can be obtained frorn y by rneans of a finite sequence of rank preserving 
equalizations. The rnain idea goes back to Dalton who noted that "... in cornparing 
two distributions, in which both the total incorne and the number of incorne receivers 
are the sarne, we rnay see that one rnight be able to be evolved frorn the other by 
rneans of a series of transfers of this kind. In such a case we could say with certainty 
that the inequality of one was less than that of the other" (Dalton (1920), p. 351). 
The following well-known theorern which is due to Hardy et al. (1934) brings all 
of these key concepts together in a unifying rnanner. It is in this sense that we refer 
to this result as the fundamental theorem of inequality economics. 
THEOREM 2.1. (Hardy-Littlewood-Polya) Let x, y E IR~, H ~ 2. The follow-
ing statements are equivalent: 
(i) x ~L y. 
(ii) X ~D y. 
(iii) W(x) ~ W(y) for all S-concave W : lR~ -+ lR. 
For extensive discussions and alternative proofs of this theorern, we refer the reader 
tú Dasgupta et al. (1973), Rotschild and Stiglitz (1973), Fields and Fei (1978), Foster 
(1985), Marshall and Olkin (1979), Arnold (1987) and Pecaric et al. (1992). 
The rnain purpose of this paper is to study a possible analogue of this farnous 
theorern in the fundarnentally different framework of opportunity distributions to 
which we now turno 
5Let f(.) be a correspondence on set A and m ~ 1. We define f(B) := UbEB f(b) for a11 B ~ A. 
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2.2 The Opportunity Distributions in a Dual Economy 
Let L be a universal set of opportunities. For instance, one might think of the elements 
of L as the Ireedoms and lunctionings a lá Sen but, of course, other interpretations 
«such as rights, basic liberties, choice of education and occupation, and so on) are 
possible. We shall maintain throughout this paper that each element of L is in sorne 
sense desirable. 
Define 
n:= {O = (01,02) E 2L X 2L : 0 1 U02 =f 0 and max{#01>#02} < oo}. 
We interpret n as the set of aH possible opportunity distributions in a two-agent 
society. (H, for instance, L is interpreted as the set of aIl functionings with respect to 
a given aspect of well-being, then the members of n can be thought of as the induced 
distributions of capability sets (cf. Sen (1992), p. 39-42).) 
We want to study an "equality' partial ordering on n which we shall denote by 
);:= • For O, V E n, we interpret O >r:= V as 1<0 is at least as equal as V". 
The following two properties are rather unexceptionable conditions to posit on 
);:=. 
AXIOM A. >r:= is a preorder on n; that is, ít is a reflexíve and transitive bínary 
reiation on n. 
AXIOM B. (Anonyrnity) Por any O E n, O,.... (02 , O¡). 
3 A PrincipIe of Equalizing Transfers 
In this section we aim to find an analog of the "principie 01 equalizing (Dalton) trans-
fers" of the unidimensional inequality measurement theory. To this end, one needs 
to uncover the idea of an equalizing operator in the present contexto This notion, of 
course, presupposes that we can decide from which agent a transfer should be made so 
as to decrease inequality. In other words, given an opportunity distribution O E n, 
we need to know who actuaHy is the "richer" agent in this distribution to define and 
apply an analog of the principIe of equalizing transfers. This leads us to consult the 
preferences of the agents over L. 
We assume that aU agents have the same preferences over L, and these are repre-
sented by a given complete preorder R e L x L. (The strict form of R is denoted by 
P.) Let 'Ro(R) be the class of aH preorders (quasi-orders) on 2L x 2L which extends 
R, that is 
'Ro(R) := {t e 2L x 2L : t is refiexive, transitive and 
't:/x,y EL: [xRy ===> {x} t {y}]}. 
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(The asymmetric and the syrnmetric components of t is denoted by ~ and ~ .) Many 
interesting examples of orderings that are in this dass are axiomaticaliy characterized 
in the literature (see, for instance, Barbera and Pattanaik (1984), Barbera et al. 
(1984), Pattanaik and Peleg (1984), Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984), Bossert (1989), 
Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Bossert et al. (1994) and Puppe 
(1995a,b)). Since it seems quite reasonable to declare an agent "richer" (or, in a more 
advantageous situation) if every option that is available to the other party is available 
to it , the fo11owing refinement of R.o(R) is of interest: 
n(R):= {t E R.o(R) : VA,B E 2L : [A 2 B ~ A t Bl}. 
That is , n(R) is a subclass of 'Ro(R) such that a11 of its members are extensions of 
the subsethood relation 2.6 For any given t E n(R), we shalllet 
If t is complete, then A(t) is the dass of a11 opportunity distributions which are 
illfare ordered. 
We can now define the equalizing transfer operator T>:. : A(t) _ 2A(1=:) with 
respect to any given complete t E n(R) as fo11ows: 
Notice that since Range T>:. = 2AO:), the transfers embodied in Tt (.) does not alter 
the intra-group ranking.7 
Let U E n and suppose that U2 ~ VI' Therefore, from the perspeetive of the 
extension t which a11 agents are assurned to agree upon, the second agent is 'richer' 
than the first one. Consequently, an equalizing transfer adds to the opportunity set 
of the first dass an opportunity x E U2 \ VI' If, on the other hand, UI ~ V2 , then both 
agents are equa11y rich, and to make the distribution more equal would require that 
we make the sets UI and U2 more "similar". Thus, an equalizing transfer adds to the 
opportunity set of the first agent an opportunity x E U2\U1 and that of the second 
agent an opportunity y E UI \U2 • If UI = U2 , an equalization cannot take place, for 
the inital distribution is already perfectly egalitarian. The fo11owing example gives a 
more concrete illustration. 
6 As innocent as it may seem, this is a considerable refinement. A major part of the literature 
concerning the extensions of an order on a set to the power set uses the Gardenfors principie as a 
basic axiom (see Kannai and Peleg (1984)). A much weaker axiom than the Gardenfors principie is 
all axiom introduced in Barbera (1977): Vx,y EL: \xRy ~ {x} >- {x,y} and {x,y} >- {y}] (see aiso 
Barbera and Pattanaik (1984)). It is obvious that no relation in R(R) can satisfy this condition. 
See also Gaertner (1990) for a criticism of the noted refinement from an aiternative perspective. 
7In the definitioll of Tt; (.), we adopt the convention that T t (U) = {U}, if U I = U2' 
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EXAMPLE 3.1. The cardinality ordering t#E 'R.(R) is defined as 
(ef. Pattanaik and Xu (1990)). On the other hand, the cardinality-first Iexico-
graphic ordering tcE 'R.(R) is defined as 
A ?:c B {:} [#A > #B] or [#A = #B and [V(x, y) E max(A) x max(B) : [xRy]] 
where, for any S ~ L, max(S) denotes the R-greatesteIements of S (cf. Bossert et al. 
(1994)). Let a,b,c E L such that aPbRc, and consider the opportunity distribution 
U = ({a}, {b,c}). In this case, 
Tt#(U) = {({a,b},{b,c}),({a,c},{b,c})} 
and 
Tt#(O) = {(a,b,c},{a,b,c})} for all O E Tt#(U), 
whereas 
We now formulate the principIe of equalizing transfers in the present context as 
an axiom. Since the equalizing transfer operator defined aboye is parametric over the 
extension ehosen from 'R.(R), so will be sueh an axiom: 
AXIOM C(?:). (PrincipIe of t-Equalization) For any U E A(t), 
O:¡:: U Jor all O E Tt(U). 
For any U E A(?:) and n = 2,3, ... , let us write 
Moreover, Iet us define, for any O E n, O() := (0(1),0(2») as the permutation of O 
sueh that O( ) E A(?:). 
We are now ready to state the following 
8Ttc (U) == 0 means that, given the data oC the example, we can never obtain a distribution 
from U by an equalizing transfer. For instance, the perfectly egalitarian opportunity distribution 
({ a, b, e}, {a, b, e}) can never be reached from U by means oC any number of equalizing transfers. 
This is, oC course, a very troubling observation which poses extreme1y difficu1t questions with regard 
to a potential theory of opportunity inequality measurement. 
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DEFINITION 3.2. The Dalton ordering induced by t E n(R) is defined as 
the refiexive relation on n such that, for any O, U E n, O i:- U, 
O ?=~ U if and only if O() E yt(U( ») for sorne n ~ 1. 
The following result is immediate: 
PROPOSITION 3.3. Let t E n(R). ?=~ is the srnallest binary relation on n which 
satisfies Axioms A, B and C(t). 
In view of Definition 3.2 and the equivalence of the statements (i) and (ii) in 
Theorem 2.1, there is a natural way of defining an analogue of the celebrated Lorenz 
ordering in the present context: the Lorenz ordering induced by t is a binary 
relation over n which is not defined recursively and yet is equal to ?=b . The following 
seetion will elaborate on this definition in a more specific framework. 
The Lorenz Ordering Induced by >- # 
In what follows we shall examine the implications of using the simplest member of 
n(R), namely the cardinality ordering (defined in Example 3.1) in making inequality 
comparisons of opportunity distributions.9 Put more concretely, we shall study the 
Lorenz omering induced by the caminality ordering. 
NOTATION. The Dalton partial ordering induced by t# is denoted by >F~ . 
Furthermore, from now on, for any O E n, O( ) := (0(1),0(2») will stand for the 
lJermutation of O such that #0(1) :::; #0(2)' (Thus, for any O E n, O( ) E A(t#).) 
DEFINITION 4.1. The (strict) Lorenz ordering induced by t#, >-tc n x n, 
is defined as follows: O >-t U if and only ifO i:- U, U1 U U2 = 0 1 U O2 and either 
#0(1) = #0(2) and U(i) ~ O(i), i = 1,2, 
or 
#0(1) < #0(2)' U(1) e 0(1) and U(2) = 0(2)'  
The weak form of >-t is defined as 
~t= >-t U {(O, O) : O En}. 
9See Sen (1991) and Klemisch-Ahlert (1993) for critical discussions about the cardinality ordering. 
In our opinion, the major shortcoming of this ordering is due to the fact that it is essentially 
independent of the underlying preferences of the agents, Le. R. lndeed, as shown by Pattanaik 
and Xu (1990), ~# is the only member of R(R) which satisfies a weak independence condition and 
which declares all the singleton sets indifferent. (See also Puppe (1995a).) 
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REMARK. We stress that >-t is not the ordinary strict Lorenz ordering simply 
applied to the cardinality distributions. To illustrate, let #L 2 3 and consider 
U = ({a}, {a,b,e}) and 0= ({a,b}, {b,e}). Clearly, (#01,#02 ) = (2,2) >L (1,3) = 
(#U1, #U2 ) whereas (O, U), (V, O) (j. >-t . O 
Why do we trust the ordinary Lorenz ordering when making income inequality 
cornparisons? Because, by Theorern 2.1, we know that an incorne distribution Lorenz 
dorninates the other if, and only if, the forrner distribution can be obtained frorn the 
latter by rneans of a finite sequence of equalizing (Dalton) transfers. The folIowing 
theorern justin.es Den.nition 4.1 in an analogous way. 
THEOREM 4.2. The Dalton ordering induced by t# is equivalent to ~r; that is 
'-# - '-#
'PL-'PD' 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. That ~~ ~ ~t can easily be verified. To see the converse 
containrnent, let O >-t U and assume that O( ) = O and U( ) = U without loss of 
generality. We rnust then have U1 U U2 = 0 1 U O2 , and one of the folIowing mutually 
exclusive cases rnust be true: 
#01 < #02 , UI COI and U2 = O2 , 
#01 = #02 , #UI = #U2 and Ui ~ Oi, i = 1,2. 
We only examine the first case, the others being entirely similar. The hypotheses 
U¡ U U2 = 0 1 U O2 and Ui ~ Oi, i = 1,2, together irnply that 
0 1 = UI U {Xl, ... , X n - m } U {y~, ... ,y~} for sorne m ~ O, 
and 
O2 = U2 U {y~, ... ,y~} for sorne m 2 o, 
where n-m = #U2 - #UI > o, Xj E U2 , j = 1, "', n-m, and y; E Ui, i = 1,2, 
j = 1, ... ,m, with the convention that {yLy~} = 0, i = 1,2. But then, since U2 >-# UI , 
and since VI ~# U2 , 
so that O E T~ (4'-m(u)) = r;: (V). Therefore, O ~~ U. Since, for any O E n,
-# -# -# 
O ~~ O by Definition 3.2, we conclude that ~t ~ ~~, and the proof is complete. O 
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COROLLARY 4.3. -;yf is the smallest binary relation on n which satisfies Axioms 
A, B and C(t#). 
REMARK. Kranich (1994) characterizes the cardinality difference ordering 
-;YCD e n x n: 
o -;YCD U if and only if 1#01 - #02 1 :s I#U1 - #U2 1. 
Let the asymmetric factor of >rCD be denoted by 'rCD. Since this ordering is oh-
viously cardinality based, one might just1y wonder if 'rCD is 'rt-consistent, Le. if 
>-cD;2 >-t or noto Let #L ~ 3, U = ({a,b},{b,c}) and O = ({a,b,c},{a,b,c}). 
Clearly, O >-f U and not O >-CD U. Consequently, we conclude that 'rCD is not 
>-f-consistent. O 
For any binary relation -;y on n, we denote the set of >r-greatest, >r-maximal, -;y-
least, and >r-minimal elements of n by G(>r), g(>r), L(>r) and ((>r), respectively.lO 
Our next proposition computes the greatest, maximal, least and minimal elements of 
n with respect to the Lorenz ordering induced by t# . 
PROPOSITION 4.4. Let #L ~ 2. Then, 
(i) G(-;yf) = 0 
(ii) g(>rf) = {O En: 0 1 = 02} 
(iii) L(-;yf) = 0 
(iv) ((-;yf) = {O En: 0(1) = 0}. 
Prool 01 Proposition 4.4. Define, for any U E n, 
A(U) := {O En: 0 1 UO2 = U1 UU2}. 
Fix an arbitrary U E n and notice that if O fj. A(U), then O and U are not ~f­
connected. This readily establishes (i) and (iii). On the other hand, (ii) irnmediately 
follows from the fact that, 
(UI UU2 , UI U U2) -;yf O for all O E A(U). 
Final1y, to see (iv), let U = (0, U2) E n and notice that, for any O E n, U >-f O 
implies that 0(1) e 0 which is absurdo Therefore, U >rf O entails that O = U. o 
I°Let ~ e n x n. We define 
G(~):= {O En: [VU En: O ~ UJ} 
and 
g(~) := {O En: [VU En: U ~ O ~ U = OJ}. 
L(~) and l'(~) are defined dually. 
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5 S#-Concavity 
We now turn our attention to welfare related properties of >rf . The following defi-
nition formula tes the concept of inequality averse welfare functions in our setting. 
DEFINITION 5.1. W : n --+ lR is said to be S#-concave if, for any O, U E n, 
O >rf U implies W(O) ~ W(U). The set of all 8#-concave functions is denoted by 
S#. 
The following lernma gives sorne exarnples of S#-concave functions which will be 
of use later on. 
LEMMA 5.2. Let o: : L --+ lR++ be any function and u: [0,1] --+ lR be any concave 
function. The followíng functions on n are g# -concave: 
VI-'t(O) = L o:(x), i = 1,2, (1) 
xeO(i) 
(2)M/;(O) = (#0~Z~02) + u (#o~Z~oJ 'U 
#(0(1)\0(2»), if #0(1) < #0(2) 
W4 (O) = (3){ #(0(1) U 0(2)), if #0(1) = #0(2) 
Proof of Lemma 5.2. That the functions given in (1) are S#-concave follows 
irnrnediately frorn the hypothesis that 0:(a) > O for all a E L. To soo the second 
assertion, fue a concave u : [0,1] -- IR and let O >-f U. As noted in Section 2, the 
concavity of u irnplies the S-concavity of (x, y) 1-+ u(x) + u(y), and hence, either 
#01= #02or #U(l) < #0(1) < #0(2) = #U(2) (and these are the only possibilities) 
so that 
To prove the final proposition, let O ~f U again, and observe that the assertion is 
trivial when #01= #O}, and #U(1) ~ #U(2) . If, on the other hand, #0(1) < #0(2)' 
we have U(l) e 0(1) and U(2) = 0(2), and hence 0 1U O2 = UI U U2 irnplies that 
vV4 (O) = #(0(1)\0(2») = #(U(l)\U(2») = W4 (U). o 
The next lernma is a crucial step toward our rnain theorern. 
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LEMMA 5.3. 1f O, U E n and 
v W E S# : [W(O) ;:: W(U)], (4) 
then U(i) ~ O(i)' i = 1,2, and 0 1 U O2 = U1 U U2• 
NOTATION. Let {All ... ,Am},: m;:: 2, be a col1ection of sets such that every two 
distinct sets in the col1ection are disjoint. The union of these sets is then written as 
Al lW A2 lW •.• lW Am · 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. By Lernma 5.2, Wt E S#, i = 1,2, for any a : L -1R.t+ so 
that by (4), 
Va: L -lR++ : [ L a(x);:: L a(x)), 
:tEO(;) :tEU(i) 
i = 1,2. Therefore, by Lemma 2.1 of Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), we must have U(i) ~ 
O(i), i = 1,2. 
To prove the second assertion, define, for any O E n 
One can easily check that both W+(.) and W_(.) are both S#-concave. Therefore, if 
(4) holds for O, U E n, we must have #(01 U O2) = #(U1 U U2 ), that is 
so that 
Now, since U(i) ~ O(i)' i = 1,2, we may write 
(6) 
fol' sorne A, B E 2L . Let 
x = (01 U 02)\(U1 U U2 ). 
(We wish to show that X = 0.) Let Zl = X n A and Z2 = X n B. We first establish 
the fol1owing 
Claim. A n B = Zl n Z2. 
PíOof of Claim. That Zl n Z2 = X n (A n B) is immediate from the definitions. 
Also recal1 that UI nA = U2 n B = 0 so that (UI U U2 ) n (A n B) = 0. Therefore, 
A n B ~ X and the claim follows. 
Now, by (6), 
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and combining this with (5), 
(7) 
On the other hand, one can easily verify that 
and thus, by the claim above, 
Hence, by (7) 
that is 
(#A - #(U2nA)) + (#B - #(Ul n B)) = #(Zl n Z2), 
which yields 
#(A\U2) + #(B\U1) = #(Zl n Z2)' (8) 
But, by definition of Zl and Z2, 
Zl n Z2 ~ A\U2 and Zl n Z2 ~ B\Ul 
so that (8) cannot hold unless #(Zl n Z2) = O. On the other hand, #(Zl n Z2) = O 
implies that #(A\U2) = #(B\U¡) = O, that is, A\U2 = 0 and B\Ul = 0, and in 
view of (6), this yields that 0 1 U O2 ~ Ul U U2 . Since we have already shown that 
U(i) ~ O(i)' i = 1,2, 0 1 U O2 ;2 Ul U U2 also holds, and hence the proof. O 
The fol1owing theorem is the main result of this section. 
THEOREM 5.4. POí any O, V E n, we have 
O >rf V if and only íf W(O) ~ W(V) fOí all W E S#. 
Proo! o! Theorem 5.4. Nece5sity follows from the definition of S#-concavity. To 
prove 5ufficiency, let O, V E n such that O =F V and 
V ~1 E $# : [W(O) ~ W(V)]. (9) 
(H O = V, the re5ult i5 trivial.) We may as5ume that O( ) = O and V( ) = V 
without 1055 of generality. Therefore, by Lemma 5.3, we have Ui ~ Oi, i = 1,2, and 
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0 1 U O2 = VI U V2 · Consequently, if #01 = #02 , that O >-t U is irnrnediate. We 
should therefore examine the case where #01< #02 , 
Assume that #01 < #02, By Lemma 5.2, (2) and (9), we have 
W~(O) 2: W~(U), for aH concave ti: [0,1] -lR. 
By a wel1-known result due to Hardy et al. (1934), p. 89, we must then have 
#01 #02) > (#V1 #V2 ) (10)( #01+ #02' #01+ #02 _L #V1 + #V2' #V1 + #V2 . 
Therefore, since #V1 = #V2 would contradict this observation, we conclude that 
#V1 < #V2· 
We now wish to establish that VI e 0 1 and V2 = O2 , By (10), we have 
#01 > #V1 > 
#0 + #0 - #V1+ #V ~ #01#V2 - #V1#02.1 2 2 
Thus, if VI = 0 1 , then #V2 ~ #02 and V2 t; O2 yields V2 = O2 which contradicts 
the hypothesis that O =J U. Hence we must have VI CO l ' To complete the proof, 
assume that V2 e O2. Since 0 1 U O2 = VI U V2, there must exist non-empty A, B 
with A e V2 and B e VI such that 0 1 = VI U A and O2 = V2U B. But then 
0 1\02 = (VI U A)\(V2U B) = VI \(V2 U B) e VI \V2 
and hence, recalling (3), 
W4 (0) = #(01\02) < #(V1\V2) = W4 (U) 
where V\!4 E S# by Lemma 5.2. This contradicts (9) and thus, we conclude that 
U'l. = O2 which, in turn, establishes that O >-t U. O 
6 A Benchmark Result 
In the previous sections, we have confined our attention to two-agent societies where 
both agents have the same preferences over the attributes in L which are represented 
by the cardinality ordering. We attempted to extend the definitions of the key notions 
of income inequality measurement theory to this admittedly restrictive framework in 
a natural way. This led us to Definitions 3.2, 4.1 and 5.1. The merit of these 
definitions is that they allow us to establish an exact analogue of the fundamental 
theorem of inequality economics in our framework. Indeed, Theorems 4.2 and 5.4 
yield the following benchmark resulto (Compare with Theorem 2.1.) 
THEOREM 6.1. Let O, U E n. The following statements are equivalent: 
(i) O ~t U 
(ii) O 'i?~ U 
(iii) W (O) 2: W (U) for all [j# -concave W : n - lR. 
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7 Monotonic Extensions of ~t 
As an indication that ~f is too incomplete, we observe its inability of comparing per-
fectly egalitarian distributions. For example, the opportunity distributions ({a}, {a}) 
and ({a,b},{a,b}), a,b EL, cannot be ranked by ~f, although it is intuitively clear 
that these distributions are equal1y unequal since both of them are perfectly egalitar-
ian. Indeed, the following axiom seems unexceptionable. 
AXIOM D. Let O E n and 0 1 = O2 • Then, O ~ U for al! U E n. 
Although ~f does not satisfy Axiom D, we can extend it in a trivial way to solve 
the problem: 
~f := ~f U{(O,U) E n x n: 0 1 = 02}' 
~f is an extension of ~f which allows us to conclude that a perfect1y egalitarian 
distribution is less unequal than any other distribution. Consequently, ({a}, {a}) ~f 
({ a, b}, {a, b}) and ({ a, b}, {a, b}) ~f ({a}, {a}). Moreover, ?==f satisfies Axioms A, B 
and C(t#). Nevertheless, ~f is still too incomplete. 
One of the axioms introduced in Kranich (1994), namely monotonicity, is ex-
tremely compelling: 
AXIOM E. (Monotonicity) Por all (0I,02),(01,U2) E n, 0 1 e O2 e U2 
implies that (01,02 ) ~ (01'U2 ), 
Let O E n. If 0 1 ~ O2 then the second party is clearly enjoying greater op-
portunities than the first one. Monotonicity axiom says that if the second party's 
opportunity set expands further, then the degree of inequality should increase. Nev-
ertheless, because of its incompleteness, ?==f is not monotonic. Before we attempt to 
remedy this shortcoming, let us first clarify that this result is far from unexpected. 
Consider the following income distributions of a two-person society: z = (1,10) 
and w = (1,15). Which distribution is more unequal? Presumably, a unanimous 
answer would be that z is more equal than w. However, the Lorenz ordering does 
not capture this c1ear intuition: (z, w), (w, z) rt ?:.L . (Recal1 Subsection 2.1.) This is 
precisely because Zl + Z2 =f W1 + W2' We have an analogous situation in the present 
contexto Let #L ?:. 3, O = ({a},{a,b}) and U = ({a},{a,b,c}). Observe that 
(O, V), (V, O) f/. ~f, and this is precisely because 0 1 U O2 =f VI U V2 • Consequently, 
if we are after an analogue of the standard Lorenz ordering in our framework of the 
measurement of opportunity inequality, that our candidate preorder is not monotonic 
is hardly surprising. 
How do we deal with cases like comparing z = (1,10) and w = (1,15) in the 
standard theory? The most common way is to invoke the axiom of scale invariance 
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(Le. x '" AX, for all x E IR~, A > O) and rather use the minimal scale invariant and 
trunsitive extension of tL (cf. Fields and Fei (1978)). (In fact, many authors take 
this extension as the definition of the Lorenz ordering.) The resulting ordering ~L 
on IR~, H 2: 2, satisfies 
This preorder captures our intuition and notes (1,10) >L (1,15). 
Unfortunately, to formulate an analog of the axiom of scale invariance in the 
present context does not soom possible. Therefore, we are led to study the monotonic 
extensions of the Lorenz ordering directly. Now, since ~L is the smallest scale in-
variant and transitive extension of ~L, by analogy, what we are after is the smallest 
monotonic and transitive extension of ~f . Fortunately, formulating this extension 
explicitly turns out to be a rather simple task. To do this, we define >-MC n x n as 
o >- M V if and only if V(l) ~ 0(1) ~ 0(2) C V(2) , 
and then extend ~f to 
,---# '-~#U '---
rML'- 'L ,M . 
We shal1 refer to >':=~L as the monotonic Lorenz ordering induced by ~# . 
(Notice that >':=~Llets us rank ({ a}, {a, b}) and ({ a}, {a, b, e}) in accordance with our 
intuition: 
({a},{a,b}) >':=~L ({a},{a,b,c}). 
The transitivity of )r~L is proved next. 
PROPOSITION 7.1. >':=~L is the smallest tmnsitive and monotonic extension 01 
~f over n. 
Prool 01 Proposition 7.1. That >':=~L is the smallest monotonic extension of ~f is 
obvious; al1 we have to show is that it is also transitive. Let O )r~L U and U >':=~L V 
fol' sorne O, V, V E n. If O ~f V ~f V or O >-M V >-M V, then there is nothing 
to prove, for both ~t and >-M are transitive. Suppose O ~t V >-M V holds. If 
0 1 = O2, the case is trivial so assume that 0(1) :f. 0(2)' This necessitates that VI :f. V 2 
and that 0 1U O2 = V] U V 2. Furthermore, V >-M V implies that V(1) C U(2)' Now let 
#0] = #02 and V(i) ~ O(i)' í = 1,2. Then, since 0 1 U O2 = VI U V 2 and V(1) C V(2) 
entail that 0(1) ~ U(1) U V(2) = V(2) , we must have V(l) ~ 0(1) ~ U(2) ~ 0(2)' In 
fad, 0(2) ~ 0 1 U O2 = VI U V 2 = V(2) so that V(2) = 0(2). But since, U >-M V, 
\~I) ~ V(l) ~ V(2) C ~2), and hence ~1) ~ V(l) ~ 0(1) ~ 0(2) = V(2) C \1(2)' 
Thel'efore, O >-M V and O )r~L V follows. If #0(1) < #0(2)' V(l) C 0(1) and 
U('2) = 0(2), the result is obtained sirnilar1y. Finally, assume that O >-M V ~f V. 
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#U(1) < #U(2) must hold since U(l) ~ 0(1) ~ 0(2) e U(2)' But then U ~t v implies 
that \1(1) e U(1) and \1(2) = U(2)' Therefore, \1(1) e U(1) ~ 0(1) ~ 0(2) e U(2) = \1(2) 
and o >-M V follows. We conclude that o :r~L V. o 
By Corol1ary 4.3, this proposition yields 
COROLLARY 7.2. :r~L is the smallest binary relation on n that satisfies Axioms 
A, B, C(?#), D and E. 
We would like to argue that :r~L is still too incomplete. Consider the oppor-
tunity distributions o = ({a}, {b, c}) and U = (0, {a, b, c}). To conclude that O is 
"more equal than" U is clearly in nature of things. However, (O, U) rj. :r~L . This 
observation leads us to consider the following strengthening ofAxiom E: 
AXIOM E*. (#-Monotonicity) Por all (01,O2), (01,U2) E n, #01 < #02 
and O2 e U2 imply that (01,02) >- (01,U2 ). 
Our final task is, therefore, to study the #-monotonic extensions of ~t .Of course, 
one irnmediate way to do this is to define >-~ e n x n as 
o >-~ U if and only if U(I) ~ 0(1), #0(1) ~ #0(2) and 0(2) e U, 
and then extend ~~to ~~ U >-~. Indeed, this would let us rank ({a}, {b,c}) and 
(0, {a, b, c}) in exacty the way we wanted: 
({a},{b,c})(~t U >-~)(0,{a,b,c}). 
However, there is a rather serious problem with this extension; it is not transitive: 
EXAMPLE 7.3. Let #L ~ 5 and let O = ({a,b,c},{c,a,d}), U = ({b,c},{a,d}) 
and V = ({b},{a,d,e}). Wehave O >-f U and U >-tt V but notO ~f V and notO 
>-~ V. Therefore, O (~~ U >-tt)U and U (~t U >-tt)V but not O (~~ U >-~)V. 
We conc1ude that ~~ U >-~ is not transitive. O 
Example 7.3 suggests that we should rather study larger #-monotonic extensions 
of ~f, or more precisely, that we should focus on transitive extensions of ~t U >-tt . 
Any transitive and #-monotonic extension of ~f is not, however, preswnably suitable 
for our purposes, for such an extension may very well lead us to rank opportunity 
distributions which we would not like too In other words, one would like to find an 
extension of ~~ which respects only the properties of #-monotonicity and transitivity. 
An arbitrary #-monotonic and transitive extension of ~~, after a11, might respect 
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some additional properties which may not be desirable. Consequently, we need to 
focus on the smallest #-monotonic and transitive extension of ~t . 
To find the smallest transitive and #-monotonic extension of ~t, we shall first 
briefiy digress on abstract relation theory. Let X be an arbitrary set and let I1(X) 
be the class of all transitive relations on X. Define the binary relation EB on II(X) as 
where 
x ~o y if and only if X(~1 U ~2)y or 3z E X: [x ~l Z ~2 y]. 
The following lemma will be quite useful for our purposes. 
LEMMA 7.4. Let X be any set and ~iE I1(X), i = 1,2. Jf, for any x, y, Z E X, 
X ~2 Z and z ~1 y implies x ~2 y, (11) 
then ~ 1 EB ~ 2 is the smallest transitive extension of ~ 1 U ~ 2 • 
NOTATION. For any x,y E X, if there exists a z E X such that x ~1 z ~2 y, we 
write x ~12 y. Therefore, ~1 EB ~2 = (~1 U ~2) U ~12. 
Proof of Lemma 7.4. Let us first demonstrate that under the hypotheses of the 
Lemma, ~1 EB ~2 needs to be transitive. Let x (~1 EB ~2)Z and z (~1 EB ~2)y, 
x,y,z EX. Now, ifx ~1 z ~2 y, thenx(~1 EB ~2)yisimmediate, andifx ~1 z ~1 y, 
or x ~2 z ~2 y, or x ~1 z ~12 y, or x ~12 Z ~2 y, X (~1 EB ~2)y follows from the 
transitivity of ~i, i = 1,2. In addition, by (11), x ~2 Z ~1 y implies x (~1 EB ~2)y, 
and by (11) and the transitivity of ~i,i = 1,2, there exist w,w' E X such that 
x ~2 z ~12 y => x ~2 z ~1 W ~2 y => x ~2 W ~2 y => x (~1 EB ~2)y, 
X ~12 Z ~1 y => x ~1 w ~2 Z ~1 y => x ~1 w ~2 y => x (~1 EB ~2)y 
and 
By these observations and the fact that (~1 U ~2) e (~1 EB ~2), we conclude that 
>-1 EB ~2 is a transitive extension of ~1 U ~2. 
Let .:J be the class of all transitive relations on X which contain >-1 U >-2. (By 
the aboye argument, (>-1 EB ~2) E .:J so that .:J =1- 0.) Define l> := n~E.7 ~. 
One can easily check that l> is transitive and (~1 U ~2) el>. Therefore, l> is the 
smallest transitive extension of >-1 U ~2, and we have l> S; (~1 EB ~2). To prove 
the converse containment, let x (>-1 EB ~2)y. If X ~i y, for some i = 1,2, then since 
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(»-l U »-2) e 1>, we have x 1> y, and if x »-1 Z >-2 y, for sorne z E X, then since 
»-'e 1>, i = 1,2, we have x 1> z 1> y, and by the transitivity of 1>, x 1> y. Thus, we 
conclude that (»-1 El' >-2) ~ 1>, and hence the lernma. O 
Let us now turn back to our main topie and state the following 
DEFINITION 7.5. The #-monotonic Lorenz ordering induced by 'c#. >r~LC 
n x n, is defined as 
= '-#M'>;# -~#L <J:7 rrmonL -
In other words, for any O, U E n, we have 
O >r:onL U <===> O ~t U or O >-~ U or (3V En: [O ~t V >-M UD. 
Therefore, that >r:onL is a #-monotonic extension of ~f is clear. (Hence, >r:onL 
is ~t -consistent, and lets us rank distributions like ({a}, { b, e}) and (0, {a, b, e}) in 
accordance with our intuition.) >r~L is, in fact, the smallest #-monotonic extension 
of ~t .To prove this, a11 we need is the following 
LEMMA 7.6. Let O, V and U be in n. lfO >-~ V and V ~t U, then O >-~ U. 
Proof of Lemma 7.6. If O >-~ V, then \1(1) ~ 0(1). #0(1) :$ #0(2) and 0(2) e \1(2) 
so that #~l) < #\1(2)' Therefore, by Definition 4.1, U(l) e \1(1) and U(2) = \1(2)' We 
must then have U(l) e 0(1) and 0(2) e U(2), and that O >-~ U follows. o 
By Lernmata 7.5 and 7.6, we therefore have the desired result: 
THEOREM 7.7. >r:Ql1L is the smallest transitive and #-monotonic extension of 
~r over n. 
Equivalently, 
COROLLARY 7.8. >r:onL is the smallest binary relation on n that satisfies Axioms 
.4, B, C(?:.#), D and E'. 
Our final proposition computes the greatest, maximal, least and minimal elements 
of n with respect to the #-monotonic Lorenz ordering induced by 'c# . (Compare 
with Proposition 4.4.) The proof is easy, and thus omitted. 
PROPOSITION 7.9. Let 00 > #L ?:. 2. Then, 
(i) G(>r:orIL) = g(>r:Ql1L) = {O En: 0 1= 02}, 
(ii) L(>r:onL ) = l(~:onL) = {(0, L)}. 
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8 Conclusion 
In our opinion there is a clear need for a more extensive analysis of inequality than 
on the basis of income differences alone. In particular, the opportunities available 
to an individual might be a more appropriate determinant of his or her wel1-being, 
and the policy implications of this might be profound. For example, policies designed 
to address measured educational differences might look markedly different if each 
individual is free and able to choose his or her level of participation. Or, in general, the 
significance of ex post differences might depend on the extent of ex ante similarities. 
In this paper, we have tried to formulate a (hopefully) promising start of a poten-
tial theory of opportunity inequality measurement by demonstrating that an exaet 
analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality economics can be established in 
the framework of two-agent societies where each agent evaluates the opportunity sets 
in terms of their cardinalities. An analog of the familiar Lorenz ordering is discovered 
and its smallest monotonic and transitive extension is characterized. 
Our study provides a straightforward research agenda: first, to generalize our 
main result (Theorem 6.1) to n-person societies; second, to generalize Theorem 6.1, if 
at aH possible, to an arbitrary ordering of the individual sets of opportunities and its 
induced Lorenz and Dalton orderings; third, to investigate more complete orderings 
that are consistent with the Lorenz ranking. These will be the subject of future 
research. 
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